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Abstract
We introduce a new framework to model interactions among
agents which seek to trade to minimize their risk with respect
to some future outcome. We quantify this risk using the con-
cept of risk measures from finance, and introduce a class of
trade dynamics which allow agents to trade contracts contin-
gent upon the future outcome. We then show that these trade
dynamics exactly correspond to a variant of randomized coor-
dinate descent. By extending the analysis of these coordinate
descent methods to account for our more organic setting, we
are able to show convergence rates for very general trade dy-
namics, showing that the market or network converges to a
unique steady state. Applying these results to prediction mar-
kets, we expand on recent results by adding convergence rates
and general aggregation properties. Finally, we illustrate the
generality of our framework by applying it to agent interac-
tions on a scale-free network.
1 Introduction
The study of dynamic interactions between agents who each
have a different stake in the world is of broad interest, espe-
cially in areas such as multiagent systems, decision theory,
and economics. In this paper, we present a new way to model
such dynamic interactions, based on the notion of risk mea-
sures from the finance literature.
The agents in our model will each hold a position, which
states how much the agent stands to gain or lose for each
possible outcome of the world. The overall outlook of an
agent’s position will be quantified by their risk measure,
which simply captures the “riskiness” of their position. To
minimize their risks, agents change their positions by trad-
ing contingent contracts amongst themselves; these con-
tracts state that the owner is entitled to some amount of
money which depends on this future outcome. Traders can
be thought of as residing on a network, the edges or hyper-
edges of which dictate which agents can trade directly.
This simple setting gives rise to several natural questions,
which we would like to understand: Given a set of agents
with initial positions, can a stable equilibrium be found,
where no agents can trade further for mutual benefit? If such
an equilibrium exists, can the agents converge to it using a
trading protocol, and if so what is the rate of convergence?
How does the structure of the underlying network affect
change these answers? What is the distribution of the agents’
risks at equilibrium, and how does an agent’s final risk de-
pend on his position in the network? This paper addresses
and provides answers to many of these questions.
Our model is heavily inspired by the work of Hu and
Storkey (2014), who use risk-measure agents to draw con-
nections between machine learning and prediction markets.
Another motivation comes from Abernethy et al. (2014),
who study a prediction market setting with risk-averse
traders whose beliefs over the outcomes are members of
an exponential family of distributions. Both papers analyze
the steady-state equilibrium of the market, leaving open the
question of how, and how fast, the market may arrive at that
equilibrium. In fact, both papers specifically point to rates
and conditions for convergence in their future work.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we
develop a natural framework to model the interactions of
networked agents with outcome-contingent utilities, which
is tractable enough to answer many of the questions posed
above. Second, by showing that our trading dynamics can be
recast as a randomized coordinate descent algorithm, we es-
tablish convergence rates for trading networks and/or agent
models which are more general than the two prediction mar-
ket papers above. Third, along the way to showing our rates,
we adapt and generalize existing coordinate descent algo-
rithms from the optimization literature, e.g. Nesterov (2012)
and Richta´rik and Taka´cˇ (2014), which may be of indepen-
dent interest.
2 Setting
Let Ω be a finite set of possible outcomes. Following
(Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2004), a position is simply a func-
tion from outcomes to the reals, X : Ω → R. Positions
can be thought of as random variables which are intended to
represent outcome-contingent monetary values. Denote by
1 : Ω → R the constant position with 1 : ω 7→ 1. The set
of all positions under consideration will be denoted X and
will be assumed to be closed under linear combination and
contain at least all the outcome-independent positions {α1 :
α ∈ R}. We will denote by ∆ the set of probability distri-
butions over Ω, namely ∆ = {p ∈ [0, 1]Ω : 〈p,1〉 = 1},
where 〈p, x〉 = ∑ω∈Ω p(ω)x(ω) is the inner product. Note
that 〈p,X〉 = Eω∼p [X(ω)], the mean under p.
When viewed as a vector space in RΩ, the set of positions
X introduced above is a subspace of dimension k ≤ |Ω|.
Hence, it must have a basis of size k, and thus we must
have some φ : Ω → Rk with the property that for all
X ∈ X , there is some r ∈ Rk such that X(ω) = r · φ(ω) =∑
i riφ(ω)i for all ω ∈ Ω.
We will make extensive use of this “compressed” form of
X , which we denote by R = Rk. Define the counterpart
X[r] ∈ X of r ∈ R to be the position X[r] : ω 7→ r · φ(ω).
The presence of outcome-independent positions then trans-
lates into the existence of some r$ ∈ R satisfying X[r$ ] =
1. Finally, we denote by Π := conv(φ(Ω)) the convex hull
of the basis function φ.
As intuition about φ and Π, it is helpful to draw anal-
ogy to the setting of prediction markets. As we will see in
Section 5, the function φ can be thought of as encoding the
payoffs of each of k outcome-contingent contracts, or secu-
rities, where contract i pays φ(ω)i for outcome ω. The space
Π then becomes the set of possible beliefs {〈p, φ〉 : p ∈ ∆}
of the expected value of the securities.
Risk Measures
Following Hu and Storkey (2014), agents in our framework
will each quantify their uncertainty in positions via a (con-
vex monetary) risk measure ρ : R → R satisfying, for all
r, r′ ∈ X :
• Monotonicity: ∀ω X[r](ω) ≤ X[r′](ω)⇒ ρ(r) ≥ ρ(r′).
• Cash invariance: ρ(r + c · r$) = ρ(r)− c for all c ∈ R.
• Convexity: ρ(λr + (1− λ)r′) ≤ λρ(r) + (1− λ)ρ(r′)
for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
• Normalization: ρ(0) = 0.
The reasonableness of these properties is usually argued as
follows (see, e.g., (Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2004)). Monotonic-
ity ensures that positions that result in strictly smaller pay-
offs regardless of the outcome are considered more risky.
Cash invariance captures the idea that if a guaranteed pay-
ment of $c is added to the payment on each outcome then
the risk will decrease by $c. Convexity states that merging
positions results in lower risk. Finally, normalization is for
convenience, stating that a position with no payout should
carry no risk.
In addition to these common assumptions, we will make
two regularity assumptions:
• Expressiveness: ρ is everywhere differentiable, and
closure{∇ρ(r) : r ∈ R} = Π.
• Strict risk aversion: the convexity inequality above is
strict unless r − r′ = λr$ for some λ ∈ R.
Expressiveness is related to the dual formulation given be-
low; roughly, it says that the agent must take into account
every possible distribution over outcomes when calculating
the risk. Strict risk aversion says that an agent should strictly
prefer a mixture of positions, unless of course the difference
is outcome-independent.
A key result concerning convex risk measures is the
following representation theorem (cf. Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2004, Theorem 4.15), Abernethy, Chen, and Vaughan
(2013, Theorem 3.2)).
Theorem 1 (Convex Risk Representation). A functional ρ :
R → R is a convex risk measure if and only if there is a
closed convex function α : Π→ R ∪ {∞} such that
ρ(r) = sup
pi∈relint(Π)
〈pi,−r〉 − α(pi). (1)
Here relint(Π) denotes the relative interior of Π, the in-
terior relative to the affine hull of Π. Notice that if f∗ de-
notes the convex conjugate f∗(y) := supx 〈y, x〉 − f(x),
then this theorem states that ρ(r) = α∗(−r). This result
suggests that the function α can be interpreted as a penalty
function, assigning a measure of “unlikeliness” α(pi) to each
expected value pi of the securities defined above. Equiva-
lently, α(〈p, φ〉) measures the unlikeliness of distribution p
over the outcomes. We can then see that the risk is the great-
est expected loss under each distribution, taking into account
the penalties assigned by α.
Risk-Based Agents
We are interested in the interaction between two or more
agents who express their preferences for positions via risk
measures. Burgert and Ru¨schendorf (2006) formalise this
problem by considering N agents with risk measures ρi for
i = 1, . . . , N and asking how to split a position r ∈ R in
to per-agent positions ri satisfying
∑
i ri = r so as to min-
imise the total risk
∑
i ρi(ri). They note that the value of
the total risk is given by the infimal convolution ∧iρi of the
individual agent risks — that is,
(∧iρi)(r) := inf
{∑
i
ρi(ri) :
∑
i
ri = r
}
. (2)
A key property of the infimal convolution, which will un-
derly much of our analysis, is that its convex conjugate is
the sum of the conjugates of its constituent functions. See
e.g. Rockafellar (1997) for a proof.
(∧iρi)∗ =
∑
i
ρ∗i . (3)
As a brief aside, we note that one could think of ∧iρi as
the “market risk”, which captures the risk of the entire mar-
ket as if it were one entity. By definition, eq. (2) says that the
market is trying to reallocate the risk so as to minimize the
net risk. This interpretation is confirmed by eq. (3) when we
interpret the duals as penalty functions as above: the penalty
of pi is the sum of the penalties of the market participants.
This collective view is useful when thinking about hierar-
chical markets, as we will discuss briefly in Section 5.
Hu and Storkey (2014) identify a special, market making
agent with risk ρ0 that aims to keep its risk constant rather
than minimising it. The risk minimising agents trade with
the market maker by paying the market maker ρ0(−r) dol-
lars in exchange for receiving position r, thus keeping the
market maker’s risk constant. We will revisit these special
constant-risk interactions in Section 5. For now, we will con-
sider quite general trading dynamics.
3 Trade Dynamics
We now describe how agents may interact with one another,
by introducing certain dynamics of trading among agents.
Recall that we have N agents, and each agent i is endowed
with a risk measure ρi. We further endow agent i with an
initial position r0i ∈ R, and let r0 =
∑
i r
0
i . We will start
time at t = 0 and denote the position of trader i at time t by
rti .
A crucial concept throughout the paper is that of surplus.
Given a subset of the agents willing to trade among them-
selves, we can quantify the total net drop in risk that group
can achieve.
Definition 1. Given rS = {ri}i∈S for some subset of agents
S, the S-surplus of r is the function Φ : R|S| → R defined
by ΦS(rS) =
∑
i∈S ρi(ri)−(∧iρi)(
∑
i∈S ri). In particular,
Φ(r) := Φ[N ](r) is the surplus function.
We now define trade functions, which are efficient in the
sense that all of this surplus is divided, perhaps unevenly,
among the agents present. A trade dynamic will then be sim-
ply a distribution over trade functions.
Definition 2. Given some subset of nodes S ⊆ [N ], we say
a function f : RN → RN is a trade function on S if
1.
∑
i∈S f(r)i =
∑
i∈S ri,
2. the S-surplus is allocated, meaning ΦS(f(r)S) = 0,
3. for all j /∈ S we have f(r)j = rj .
The following result shows that trade functions have re-
markable structure: once the subset S is specified, the trade
function is completely determined, up to cash transfers. In
other words, the surplus is removed from the position vec-
tors, and then it is redistributed as cash to the traders, and the
choice of trade function is merely in how this redistribution
takes place. The fact that the derivatives match has strong
intuition from prediction markets: agents must agree on the
price.
Theorem 2. The trade functions on any S ⊆ [N ] are
unique up to zero-sum cash transfers. Moreover, if f is a
trade function on S, then ∇ρi(f(r)i) = pi∗S for all i, where
pi∗S = minpi∈Π
∑
i∈S αi(pi)−
〈
pi,
∑
i∈S ri
〉
.
Proof. By (Hiriart-Urruty and Lemare´chal, 1993, eq.
X1.3.4.5), which gives a very general result about infimal
convolutions, we have that the condition ΦS(f(r)S) = 0
implies the existence of some pi such that ∇ρi(f(r)i) = pi
for all i ∈ S. The fact that pi = pi∗S follows by eq. (3)
and the definition of the conjugate. We can now charac-
terize such trade functions: by cash invariance, it is clear
that ∇ρi(f(r)i) = ∇ρi(f(r)i + cir$) for all ci ∈ R, and
the strict risk aversion property says that these are the only
such positions with the same derivative (otherwise convexity
would imply ρi is flat in between, a contradiction). The re-
quirement that
∑
i f(r)i =
∑
i ri ensures
∑
i ci = 0, mean-
ing f(r) is unique up to zero-sum cash transfers.
Our notion of trade dynamics, defined below, is quite in-
tuitive — predefined groups of agents Si gather at random
to negotiate a trade which minimizes their total risk, sub-
ject to the constraint that trading may only be among those
gathered.
Definition 3. Given m subsets S = {Si}mi=1 and m trade
functions fi on Si, and a distribution p ∈ ∆m with full sup-
port, a trade dynamic is the randomized algorithm which se-
lects fi with probability pi and takes rt+1 = fi(rt). A fixed
point r of the trade dynamic is a point with fi(r) = r for all
i ∈ [m].
We now give a few natural instantiations of trade dynam-
ics which we will use throughout the paper.
Let G be a directed graph with a node for each agent.
An edge dynamic has a trade function f(i,j) on {i, j} for
each edge (i, j) in G, where if r′ = f(i,j)(r) we have
ρj(r
′
j) = ρj(rj) and ρi(r
′
i) = ρi(ri) − Φ{i,j}(r{i,j}).
In other words, the agents minimize their collective risks,
but agent i takes all of the surplus. Similarly, a node dy-
namic has a trade function fi for each node i ∈ [N ], on
Si = {j : (i, j) ∈ E(G)} ∪ {i}, the out-neighborhood of
i, and r′ = fi(r) satisfies ρj(r′j) = ρj(rj) for j ∈ Si \ {i}
while ρi(r′i) = ρi(ri)− ΦSi(rSi).
A third dynamic we will consider uses a notion of
fairness; call a trade function f on S fair if it satisfies
ρi(f(r)i) = ρi(ri) − 1|S|ΦS(rS) for all i ∈ S. Then a fair
trade dynamic is simply a mixture of fair trade functions.
Returning to the graph theme, we may define fair versions
of the node and edge dynamics above, in the natural way.
For all these types of trade dynamics, we will see that the
only crucial property is that of connectedness, which ensures
that trades can eventually travel from one agent to any other.
Given this property, we show a quite general equilibrium re-
sult.
Definition 4. A trade dynamic with subsets S is connected
if the hypergraph with nodes [N ] and hyperedges S is a con-
nected hypergraph.
Theorem 3. Let pi∗ = minpi∈Π
∑
i αi(pi) −
〈
pi, r0
〉
. There
exists r∗ ∈ RN such that for all connected trade dynamics
D, the unique fixed point of D is r∗, up to zero-sum cash
transfers. Moreover, Φ(r∗) = 0 and∇ρi(r∗i ) = pi∗ for all i.
Proof. Let D = ({Si}mi=1, {fi}mi=1, p) be any connected
trade dynamic, and assume fi(r) = r for all i. This implies
ΦSi(rSi) = 0 for all i. By Theorem 2, this means that for all
i and all j, j′ ∈ Si we have∇ρj(rj) = ∇ρj′(rj′). This gives
us m equivalence classes of derivatives, and by connected-
ness of the trade dynamic, we in fact have some pi for which
∇ρj(rj) = pi for all j ∈ [N ]. We can now appeal to (Hiriart-
Urruty and Lemare´chal, 1993, Prop X1.3.4.2), which again
is for general infimal convolutions, to conclude Φ(r) = 0.
As this was the starting point in the proof of Theorem 2, we
immediately obtain pi = pi∗, and r = r∗ up to cash transfers.
The result of Theorem 3 is somewhat surprising — not
only is there a unique equilibrium (up to cash transfers) for
all connected dynamics, but all connected dynamics have
the same equilibrium! If one restricts to connected graphi-
cal networks, this means that the equilibrium does not de-
pend on the network structure. The power of our framework
is that the equilibrium analysis holds regardless of the way
agents interact, as long as information is allowed to spread to
all agents eventually. In fact, one could even consider an ar-
bitrary process choosing subsets St of agents to trade at each
time t; if the set S of subsets which are visited infinitely of-
ten yields a connected hypergraph, then the proof Theorem 3
still applies.
4 Rates via Coordinate Descent
Now that the existence of an equilibrium has been estab-
lished, we turn to the question of convergence. In this sec-
tion, we will show that our trade dynamics are performing a
type of randomized coordinate descent algorithm, where the
coordinate subspaces correspond to subsets S of agents. Our
coordinate subspaces are more general than is currently con-
sidered in the literature, so to derive our convergence rates
we will first need to introduce a generalization of existing
coordinate descent methods. Using standard techniques to
analyze it, we will arrive at convergence rates for very gen-
eral classes of our dynamics.
Before reviewing the literature on coordinate descent, let
us briefly see why this is a useful way to think of our dy-
namics. Recall that we have m subsets of agents Si, and that
each trade function fi only modifies the positions of agents
in Si. Thinking of (r1, . . . , rN ) as a large Nk vector (recall
R = Rk), the trade function fi is thus modifying only |Si|
blocks of k entries. Moreover, fi is minimizing the sum of
the risks of agents in Si. Hence, ignoring for now the con-
straint that the sum of the positions remain constant, fi is
performing a block coordinate descent step of the surplus
function Φ on this block of coordinates.
Randomized coordinate descent
Several randomized coordinate descent methods have ap-
peared in the literature recently, with increasing levels of
sophistication. While earlier methods focused on updates
which only modified disjoint blocks of coordinates (Nes-
terov, 2012; Richta´rik and Taka´cˇ, 2014), more recent meth-
ods allow for more general configurations, such as over-
lapping blocks (Necoara, 2013; Necoara, Nesterov, and
Glineur, 2014; Reddi et al., 2014). In fact, these last three
methods are closest to what we study here; the authors con-
sider an objective which decomposes as the sum of convex
functions on each coordinate, and study coordinate updates
which follow a graph structure, all under the constraint that
coordinates sum to 0. Despite the similarity of these meth-
ods to our trade dynamics, we require even more general
updates, as we allow coordinate i to correspond to arbitrary
subsets Si.
Fortunately, as we will see, there is a common technique
underpinning the five papers mentioned above, and by view-
ing this technique abstractly, we can generalize it to our set-
ting. Roughly speaking, the recipe is as follows:
1. Derive a quadratic upper bound via Lipschitz continuity;
2. Minimize this upper bound to obtain the update step;
3. Pick a norm based on the update which captures the ex-
pected progress per iteration;
4. Use the definition of the dual norm and the convexity of
the objective to relate this progress to the optimality gap
and a global notion of distance (the functionR2 below);
5. Chain the per-iteration progress bounds into a conver-
gence rate.
We now follow this recipe to present and analyze a gen-
eral randomized coordinate descent method, Algorithm 1,
for a convex objective F which performs updates on arbi-
trary subspaces. We will represent these subspaces as matri-
ces {Ai ∈ Rn×ki}, where an update in coordinate i is con-
strained to be in the image space of Ai. In other words, if
xt+1 ← xt + d, we require d ∈ im(Ai). We believe that our
analysis can be used to recover the smooth-objective results
from the five papers mentioned above.
Algorithm 1 Randomized Coordinate Descent, adapted
from (Richta´rik and Taka´cˇ, 2014, Alg. 3)
Require: Convex function F : Rn → R, initial point
x0 ∈ Rn, matrices {Ai ∈ Rn×ki}mi=1, smoothness pa-
rameters {Li}mi=1, distribution p ∈ ∆m
1: for iteration t in {0, 1, 2, · · · } do
2: Sample i from p
3: xt+1← xt − 1LiAiAi
+∇F (xt)
4: end for
We will assume that F is Li-smooth with respect to the
image space of the Ai; this is step 1 of our recipe. Precisely,
we require the existence of constants Li such that for all
y ∈ im(Ai),
F (x+ y) ≤ F (x) + 〈∇F (x), y〉+ Li2 ‖y‖22 , (4)
and refer to this condition as F being Li-Ai-smooth. Note
that as prescribed by step 2 of our general approach, mini-
mizing this bound over all x′ for y = Aix′ yields the update
on line 3 of the algorithm.
On to step 3, we now introduce a seminorm ‖ · ‖A which
will measure the progress per iteration of Algorithm 1:
‖x‖A :=
(
m∑
i=1
pi
Li
‖AiAi+x‖22
)1/2
, (5)
whereM+ denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse ofM .
Note that this is a Euclidean seminorm ‖x‖A = 〈Ax, x〉
with A =
∑ pi
Li
AiAi
+. By allowing this to be a seminorm,
we can easily capture linear constraints, such as
∑
i xi = c
for some constant c; to achieve this, simply ensure that it
holds for x0 and that 1 ∈ kerAi for all i. Also, in contrast
to Nesterov (2012); Richta´rik and Taka´cˇ (2014), we do not
assume that the matrices Ai have disjoint images.
Finally, for step 4 of our recipe, we will need the dual
norm of ‖ ·‖A, from which we may define the distance func-
tion we need. Let X(A) := {x0 + Ay : y ∈ Rn} denote
the optimization domain, and Fmin := minx∈X(A) F (x)
and F arg := arg minx∈X(A) F (x) denote the minimum and
minimizers of F , respectively.
‖y‖∗A :=
{
〈A+y, y〉1/2 if y ∈ im(A)
∞ otherwise. (6)
R2(x0) := max
x∈X(A):F (x)≤F (x0)
max
x∗∈F arg
‖x− x∗‖∗ 2A . (7)
One can indeed check that ‖ · ‖∗A is the dual norm of ‖ · ‖A,
in the sense that
(
1
2‖ · ‖2A
)∗
= 12‖ · ‖∗ 2A .
We are now ready to prove anO(1/t) convergence rate for
Algorithm 1. Our analysis borrows heavily from Richta´rik
and Taka´cˇ (2014) and Necoara, Nesterov, and Glineur
(2014); we give the full proof in Appendix A for complete-
ness.
Theorem 4. Let F , {Ai}i, {Li}i, x0, and p be given as in
Algorithm 1, with the condition that Ai are full rank and F
is Li-Ai-smooth for all i. Then
E
[
F (xt)− Fmin] ≤ 2R2(x0)
t
. (8)
To illustrate the power of Theorem 4, we show in Ap-
pendix B how to leverage results from spectral graph theory
to recover results in the literature for specific graphs, each of
which correspond to special cases of the subspaces {Ai}i.
For now, we simply apply our results to the risk network
framework.
Application to trade dynamics
To apply Theorem 4 to our setting, we will simply take F =
Φ, viewed as a function on RNk, and construct subspaces
which correspond to the trade function subsets Si. (Recall
that R = Rk.) For each Si, pick some j∗ ∈ Si and let Bi ∈
RN×(|Si|−1) with columns ej−ej∗ for j ∈ Si \{j∗}, where
the ej are standard column vectors with 1 in position j and
0 elsewhere. This enforces the constraint that Biy sums to 0
for all y ∈ R|Si|−1. To turn this into a matrix of the correct
dimensions, we will merely take the Kronecker product with
the k × k identity matrix, Ik. Putting this all together, our
setting can be expressed as
F : RNk → R; F (x) = Φ(x)
Ai ∈ RNk×(|Si|−1)k; Ai = Bi ⊗Ik .
Of course, to apply Theorem 4, we will needR2(x0) to be
finite; otherwise the bounds given are meaningless. This is
easily obtained, as the set {x : F (x) ≤ F (x0)} is bounded
(and convex), and for all x∗ ∈ F arg and x ∈ X(A) we have
x− x∗ ∈ im(A), so by eq. (6) ‖x− x∗‖∗A is also bounded.
Theorem 5. For any connected trade dynamic, we have
E [Φ(rt)] = O(1/t).
Proof. As our risks are differentiable, their conjugates are
strictly convex functions, and hence strongly convex as Π is
compact. We conclude that we have some {σi ∈ R}i such
that ρi is σi-smooth. Now taking Li = maxj∈Si σj , one can
see that F is Li-Ai-smooth for all i by eq. (4).
Now note that Algorithm 1 carries no state aside from
xt, and hence the analysis depends on the drop in the ob-
jective function per step. In other words, given xt, the
analysis holds for any algorithm satisfying F (xt+1) ≤
F (xt − AiAi+∇F (xt)). As trade dynamics actually mini-
mize F (xt − Aiy) over all y, this property trivially holds,
and thus the result of Theorem 4 applies.
Amazingly, Theorem 5 holds for all connected trade dy-
namics, as they each minimize the surplus in whichever Si
is chosen, and that is enough for the bounds from Theorem 4
to apply. In fact, it is more than enough: as Theorem 4 holds
even for gradient updates as in Algorithm 1, the rates extend
to less efficient trade dynamics, as long as the drop in sur-
plus is at least as large as, or even within a constant factor
of, the gradient update in Algorithm 1. This suggests that
our convergence results are robust with respect to the model
of rationality one employs; if agents have bounded rational-
ity and cannot compute positions which would exactly min-
imize their risk, but instead approximate it within a constant
factor of the gradient update, the rate remains O(1/t).
5 Application to Prediction Markets
Our analysis was motivated in part by work that considered
the equilibria of prediction markets with specific models of
trader behavior: traders as risk minimizers (Hu and Storkey,
2014); and traders with exponential utilities and beliefs from
exponential families (Abernethy et al., 2014). In both cases,
the focus was on understanding the properties of the market
at convergence, and questions concerning whether and how
convergence happened were left as future work. We now ex-
plain how this earlier work can be seen as a special case of
our analysis with an appropriate choice of network structure
and dynamics. In doing so we also generalize several earlier
results.
Following Abernethy, Chen, and Vaughan (2013), a cost
function-based prediction market consists of a collection of
k outcome-dependent securities {φ(·)i}ki=1 that pay φ(ω)i
dollars should outcome ω ∈ Ω occur. A market maker be-
gins with an initial position r0 ∈ R, the liability vector, and
a cost function C : R → R. A trader who wishes to pur-
chase a bundle of securities r ∈ R is charged price(r) :=
C(rt + r)−C(rt) by the market maker which then updates
its liability to rt+1 = rt + r. The desirable properties for
cost functions are quite different from those of risk mea-
sures (e.g. information incorporating, arbitrage-free), yet as
observed by Hu and Storkey (2014), the duality-based rep-
resentation of cost functions is essentially the same as the
one for risk measures (compare Theorem 1 and (Abernethy,
Chen, and Vaughan, 2013, Theorem 5)). In essence then,
cost functions are risk measures, though because liability
vectors measure losses and position vectors measure gains,
we simply have ρC(r) = C(−r).
In the prediction market of Hu and Storkey (2014), agents
have risk measures ρi and positions ri. A trade of r between
such and agent a market maker with cost function C and po-
sition rt makes the agent’s new risk ρi(ri+r−price(r) ·r$)
since the market maker charges price(r) dollars for r. Sim-
ilarly, one can check that the market maker’s risk remains
constant for all trades of this form.
An agent minimizing its risk implements the trading func-
tion (Definition 2) f : (−rt, ri) 7→ (−rt − r, ri + r) since
minr ρi(ri + r− (C(rt + r)−C(rt)) · r$) = minr ρi(ri +
r) + ρC(−rt− r) by cash invariance of ρi, guaranteeing the
surplus between the agent and market maker is zero. Thus,
one could think of agents in a risk-based prediction market
as residing on a star graph, with the market maker in the cen-
ter. By Theorem 3, any trade dynamic which includes every
agent with positive probability will converge, and Theorem 5
gives an O(1/t) rate of convergence.
An important special case is where agents all share the
same base risk measure ρ, but to different degrees bi which
intuitively correspond to a level of risk affinity. Specifically,
let ρi(r) = biρ(r/bi), where a higher bi corresponds to a
more risk-seeking agent.1 As we now show, the market equi-
librium gives agent i a share of the initial sum of positions
r0 proportional to his risk affinity, and the final “consensus”
price of the market is simply that of a scaled version of r0.
Theorem 6. Let ρ be a given risk measure, and for each
agent i choose an initial position r0i ∈ R and risk defined by
ρi(ri) = biρ(ri/bi) for some bi > 0. Let r0 =
∑
i r
0
i , and
define r ∈ RN by ri = bir0/
∑
j bj . Then r is the unique
point up to zero-sum cash transfers such that Φ(r) = 0.
Moreover, r satisfies for all i,
∇ρi(ri) = ∇ρ
(
r0/
∑
j bj
)
. (9)
Proof. Note that ∇ρi(ri) = ∇ρ(ri/bi) = ∇ρ(r0/
∑
j bj).
By the proof of Theorem 2, r must then satisfy Φ(r) = 0,
and is the unique such point up to cash transfers.
This result generalizes those in §5 of Abernethy et al.
(2014), where traders are assumed to maximize an expected
utility of the form Ub(w) = −b exp(−w/b) under beliefs
drawn from an exponential family with sufficient statistic
given by the securities φ. The above result shows that ex-
actly the same weighted distribution of positions at equi-
librium occurs for any family of risk-based agents, not just
those derived from exponential utility via certainty equiv-
alents (Ben-Tal and Teboulle, 2007). In addition, this gen-
eralization shows that the agents need not have exponential
family beliefs: their positions ri act as general natural pa-
rameters, and 1/bi acts as a general measure of risk aversion.
Finally, this connection also means our analysis applies to
their setting, addressing their future work on dynamics and
convergence.
Remarks. In Section 2, we observed that one could think
of ∧iρi as the “market risk”; we now have enough context
to understand the impact of this idea, by considering inter-
actions between markets. Consider an arbitrary connected
graph G on N “meta-agents”, and for each of these agents,
attach a collection of new “child” agents, calling the com-
bined graph H; hence, each node in H which came from G
is the center of its own star graph (see Figure 1). One can
think of this setting as a network of market makers, each
with disjoint trading populations. By the associativity of the
infimal convolution, and Theorem 3, the equilibrium of the
1Note however that agents are still risk-averse; only in the limit
as b→∞ do the traders become risk-neutral.
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Figure 1: A meta market.
combined graph H is the same as that of G, if we replace
the risk of each meta-agent by the infimal convolution of
the risks in its star graph. Another instantiation of this idea
would be to build a hierarchical market, or “deep market”,
corresponding to a massive tree, where each node serves as
a market maker for the nodes below, but acts as a trader in
the market above. Again, under our model, the aggregation
properties of such a hierarchical market would be exactly
the same as the flattened market, where all agents interacted
directly with the root market maker.
Another interpretation of the idea of meta-agents is
through the lens of Coase’s theory of the firm (Coase, 1937).
Firms, according to Coase, arise when transaction costs
make market coordination inefficient, allowing agents to co-
ordinate without recourse to a price mechanism. Our risk
network model could be extended by introducing a fixed
transaction cost for each trade along an edge in a network. If,
in the meta-agent example described above, the average sur-
plus per agent in a star graph was comparable to the trans-
action cost then it is advantageous for the group to form a
“firm” where agents agree to aggregate their positions and
risk since trades along the edges of the star graph will de-
plete each agent’s share of the surplus. All agents then stand
to gain from the meta-agent’s interaction with the rest of the
network without incurring the transaction costs required to
redistribute those gains. Given an initially unstructured col-
lection of agents, one can imagine a network forming to off-
set transaction costs. Different groupings of agents into firms
and the placement of edges between them would have an ef-
fect on how much of the global surplus would be taken by
agents versus how much would be lost to transaction costs.
The specifics of this sort of model is left to future work.
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Figure 2: Percentage of captured surplus per trader vs. num-
ber of trading neighbors for fair edge dynamic (green cir-
cles) and fair node dynamic (blue crosses). The dashed black
line shows the fair distribution for 200 agents (0.5%).
6 Experimental Results
The theoretical results above show that the minimal value of
a risk network is independent of its topology and the dy-
namic used to achieve convergence. However, due to the
cash invariance of the traders’ risk measures there are many
different trades that can reduce the network’s surplus to zero.
If a fair dynamic is used to find the optimal trade amongst
all traders in a network then convergence will occur in one
step and, by the definition, the drop in risk for all the traders
will be equal. When traders are only allowed to trade with
the neighbors in a network it is less obvious what effect the
dynamics will have on the final distribution of risk at con-
vergence.
To better understand the effect of network topology and
dynamics on the redistribution of risk, we implemented
a simulation of network trading dynamics in Python. The
package networkx is used to generate random scale-free
networks of 200 agents. We opted to study scale-free net-
works as these have properties similar to naturally occur-
ring networks (e.g., power law distributed vertex degrees).
Each agent in our simulated networks have entropic risk and
uniformly randomly drawn positions from [−50, 50]3. Node
(respectively, edge) dynamics are implemented by choosing
a network vertex (resp., edge) uniformly at random and then
finding and executing the optimal trade between the neigh-
bours of the selected vertex (resp., endpoints of the edge).
Finding optimal trades between a collection of agents is im-
plemented using SciPy’s optimizemethod. In both exper-
iments, 10 different networks (i.e., with different initial po-
sitions and structure) were each run 10 times with the edge
dynamic and with the node dynamic, giving a total of 100
trials with 200 agents for each dynamic. Each trial was run
for a maximum of 1000 steps of the dynamic.
Figure 2 shows how the number of trading neighbors an
agent has affects the proportion of the surplus that agent
takes once the network converges. For each dynamic, each
of the 100 × 200 points shows a single agent’s degree and
the percentage of the surplus it took at the end of each trial.
The results clearly show the strong influence of agent degree
on its ability to minimize its risk under edge dynamics. The
effect is much weaker for node dynamics. One possible ex-
planation for this is that high degree agents are selected less
frequently under node dynamics, but also have to share the
surplus with many more nodes. We give further plots in the
Appendix.
7 Conclusions
We have developed a framework to analyze arbitrary net-
works of risk-based agents, giving a very general analysis of
convergence and rates, and addressing open issues in both
Hu and Storkey (2014) and Abernethy et al. (2014). We view
this as a foundation, which opens more questions than it an-
swers. For example, can we improve the asymptotic rates of
convergence? One potential technique would be to show that
trading never leaves a bounded region, and carefully apply-
ing bounds for strongly convex functions (modulo the r$ di-
rection), which could give a rate as fast asO(1/2t). An even
broader set of questions has to do with the distribution of risk
— how does the network topology effect the outcome on the
agent level? As our experiments show, even local properties
of the network may have a strong effect on the final distri-
bution of risks, and understanding this relationship is a very
interesting future direction.
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A Proof of Theorem 4
Before giving the proof, we note that the result in (Richta´rik
and Taka´cˇ, 2014, Thm 11) also holds for general Eu-
clidean norms ‖ · ‖(i). We leave out such extensions as ul-
timately the only change is in the update step (by leverag-
ing e.g. (Richta´rik and Taka´cˇ, 2014, Lemma 10) instead of
our pseudoinverse update) and the form of the dual norm.
Lemma 1 below verifies that ‖ · ‖A is still a seminorm in
these cases.
Proof of Theorem 4. To begin, suppose subspace i is cho-
sen at step t. Letting z = 1LiAi
+∇F (xt) and y = Aiz ∈
im(Ai), the drop in the objective can be bounded using
eq. (4),
F (xt)− F (xt − y) ≥ 〈∇F (xt), y〉− Li
2
‖y‖22 . (10)
By properties of the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse, we have
arg max
z∈Rn
〈∇F (xt), Aiz〉− Li
2
‖Aiz‖22
= arg min
z∈Rn
‖Aiz −∇F (xt)‖2 = Ai+z,
but we also have that
max
z∈Rn
〈∇F (xt), Aiz〉− Li
2
‖Aiz‖22
= max
z∈Rn
〈
A>i ∇F (xt), z
〉− Li
2
〈
A>i Aiz, z
〉
=
1
2Li
〈
(A>i Ai)
−1A>i ∇F (xt), A>i ∇F (xt)
〉
=
1
2Li
‖AiAi+∇F (xt)‖22 ,
where we used the fact that Ai is full rank and the identities
A+ = (A>i Ai)
−1A>i and AiAi
+Ai = Ai. Putting these
together with eq. (10) and the fact that xt+1 = xt − y when
i is chosen, we have
F (xt)− F (xt+1) ≥ 1
2Li
‖AiAi+∇F (xt)‖22 . (11)
Now looking at the expected drop in the objective, we have
F (xt)− E [F (xt+1)|xt] ≥ m∑
i=1
pi
1
2Li
‖AiAi+∇F (xt)‖22
=
1
2
‖∇F (xt)‖2A .
To complete step 4 of our recipe and relate our per-round
progress to the gap remaining, we observe that
F (xt)− Fmin
≤ max
x∗∈arg minx F (x)
〈∇F (xt), x∗ − xt〉
≤ max
x∗∈arg minx F (x)
‖∇F (xt)‖A ‖x∗ − xt‖∗A
≤ ‖∇F (xt)‖A max
x∗∈arg minF
max
x:F (x)≤F (x0)
‖x∗ − x‖∗A
= ‖∇F (xt)‖A R(x0) ,
where we used convexity of F , the definition of the dual
norm, the fact that F (xt) is non-increasing in t, and finally
the definition ofR. We now haveF (xt)−E [F (xt+1)|xt] ≥
(F (xt)−Fmin)/(2R2(x0)). The remainder of the proof fol-
lows an argument of Necoara, Nesterov, and Glineur (2014)
by analyzing ∆t = E
[
F (xt)− Fmin]. From the last in-
equality we have ∆t+1 ≤ ∆t − ∆2t/2R2(x0), and since
∆t+1 ≤ ∆t, this gives ∆−1t ≤ ∆−1t+1 − (2R2(x0))−1. Sum-
ming these inequalities gives the result.
Lemma 1. Let seminorms {‖ ·‖(i)}mi=1 and positive weights
{wi}mi=1 be given, and define the function ‖ · ‖W : Rn → R
by
‖x‖W =
(
m∑
i=1
wi‖x‖2(i)
)1/2
. (12)
Then ‖ · ‖W is a seminorm. It is additionally a norm if and
only if ‖x‖(i) = 0 holds for all i only when x = 0.
Proof. First, note that we may fold the weights into the
seminorms, ‖x‖′(i) := ‖
√
wi x‖(i), so we can assume wi =
1 for all i without loss of generality. Let ϕ : Rn → Rm be
given by ϕ(x)i = ‖x‖(i). Then ‖x‖W = ‖ϕ(x)‖2.
• Absolute homogeneity. First observe that ϕ(αx) =
|α|ϕ(x) by homogeneity of the ‖ · ‖(i). Then ‖αx‖W =
‖|α|ϕ(x)‖2 = |α|‖x‖W .
• Subadditivity. We first recall the fact that if xi ≥ yi for all
i, then ‖x‖2 ≥ ‖y‖2. Combining this fact with subaddi-
tivity of the ‖ · ‖(i) and then of ‖ · ‖2, we have
‖x+ y‖W = ‖ϕ(x+ y)‖2 ≤ ‖ϕ(x) + ϕ(y)‖2
≤ ‖ϕ(x)‖2 + ‖ϕ(y)‖2 = ‖x‖W + ‖y‖W .
We now show the norm condition. First, we assume
‖x‖(i) = 0 for all i implies x = 0; we will show Separa-
tion. We clearly have ‖0‖W = 0. By the above, ‖x‖W = 0
implies ‖ϕ(x)‖2 = 0, yielding ‖x‖(i) = 0 for all i by defi-
niteness of ‖ · ‖2, and hence x = 0 by assumption.
For the converse, observe that any x 6= 0 with ‖x‖(i) = 0
for all iwould imply a violation of definiteness, as ϕ(x) = 0
and hence ‖x‖W = ‖ϕ(x)‖2 = ‖0‖2 = 0.
B Coordinate descent bounds
We show here that by formulating a general algorithm to
perform coordinate descent steps along arbitrary subspaces,
we can recover existing algorithms via reduction to the com-
putation of a matrix pseudoinverse. As we will see, for the
special case of edge updates in a graph, we can leverage ex-
isting results in spectral graph theory to analyze new graphs
currently not considered in the literature.
Let us first consider an optimization problem on the com-
plete graph, which picks an edge (i, j) uniformly at random
and optimizes in coordinates i and j under the constraint
that xt+1i + x
t+1
j = x
t
i + x
t
j . This corresponds to subspaces
A(i,j) = ei − ej , where ei is the ith standard unit vector,
making A(i,j)A
+
(i,j) =
1
2 (ei − ej)(ei − ej)>. Assuming a
global smoothness constant L, one can calculate
A = 2LN(N−1)
∑
(i,j)
A(i,j)A
+
(i,j) =
1
L(N−1)
(
I − 1N 1
)
,
A+ = L(N − 1)(I − 1N 1) ,
where 1 is the N × N all-ones matrix. Now as im(A) =
ker(1), this gives
‖x‖∗ 2A = L(N − 1)‖x‖22 . (13)
Similarly, the complete rank-K hypergraph gives ‖x‖∗ 2A =
LN−1K−1‖x‖22. (Compare to eq. (3.10) and the top of p.21
of Necoara, Nesterov, and Glineur (2014).) Letting C0 =
4Lmaxx∈X(A):F (x)≤F (x0) maxx∗∈F arg ‖x − x∗‖22, which
is independent of the (hyper)graph as long as it is connected,
we thus have a convergence rate of N−12 C0 1t for the com-
plete graph, and more generally N−12(K−1) C0 1t for the com-
plete K-graph. Henceforth, we will consider the coefficient
in front of C0 to be the convergence rate, as all other param-
eters
The above matrix A is a scaled version of what is known
as the graph Laplacian matrix; given a graph G with adja-
cency matrix A(G) and degree matrix D(G) with the de-
grees of each vertex on the diagonal, the Laplacian is the
matrix
L = L(G) := D(G)−A(G) . (14)
One can check that indeed, L = 2∑(i,j)∈E(G)A(i,j)A+(i,j),
meaning A = p2LL, where p = 1/|E(G)| is the uniform
probability on edges.
The graph Laplacian is an extremely well-studied object
in spectral graph theory and many other domains, and we
can use existing results to establish bounds for more inter-
esting graphs. In particular, we will be interested in the sec-
ond smallest eigenvalue of L, λ2(G); it is easy to see that
the smallest eigenvalue is λ1(G) = 0 with eigenvector 1.
The reason for this focus is in the combination of the fol-
lowing two facts: (1) the norm 〈Bx, x〉1/2 for symmetric B
can be bounded by the maximum eigenvalue of B, and (2)
the maximum eigenvalue of B+ is equal to the inverse of
the smallest nonzero eigenvalue of B, provided again that B
is symmetric.2 In particular, the smallest nonzero eigenvalue
ofA is simply p2Lλ2(G). Hence, for any connected graphG,
we have
‖x‖∗ 2A ≤ 2L
|E(G)|
λ2(G)
‖x‖22 . (15)
Of course, by the above definition of C0 and Theorem 4, this
yields the result
E
[
F (xt)− Fmin] ≤ |E(G)|
λ2(G)
C0 1
t
, (16)
showing us how tightly related this eigenvalue is to rate of
convergence of Algorithm 1.
2These facts follow from the operator norm and singular-value
decomposition for the pseudoinverse, respectively, together with
the fact that singular values are eigenvalues for symmetric matrices.
Graph |V (G)| |E(G)| λ2(G)
KN N N(N − 1)/2 N
PN N N − 1 2(1−cos piN )
CN N N 2(1−cos 2piN )
KM,K M +K MK K
BK 2
K K2K−1 2
Table 1: Vertices, edges, and algebraic connectivities for
common graphs.
As it happens, this second-smallest eigenvalue λ2(G) is
called the algebraic connectivity of G, and is itself thor-
oughly studied in spectral and algebraic graph theory. For
example, it is known (and easy to check) that λ2(KN ) = N ,
where KN denotes the complete graph; this together with
|E(KN )| = N(N − 1)/2 immediately gives eq. (13). In de
Abreu (2007), algebraic connectivities are also given for the
path on N vertices PN , the cycle CN , the bipartite complete
graphKM,K forK < M , and theK-dimensional cubeBK .
Putting these eigenvalues together yields Table 1.
Using the values in Table 1, we can directly compare the
theoretical convergence rates for different graphs.3 For ex-
ample, the star graph KN−1,1 is the natural network for pre-
diction markets in Section 5; plugging in the values from
Table 1 into eq. (15), we see that, despite its sparsity, the
convergence rate for the star graph (N − 1)(1)/(1) =
(N − 1) is within a factor of 2 of the rate for complete
graph. The path and cycle fare much worse, yielding roughly
N/2(N−2/2) = N3 asN becomes large (applying the Tay-
lor expansion and ignoring pi terms). Finally, an interesting
result due to Mohar (1991) says that for any connected graph
on N vertices, we have λ2(G) ≥ 4/(Ndiam(G)) where
diam(G) is the diameter of G. Hence for any graph we cer-
tainly have
E
[
F (xt)− Fmin] ≤ N |E(G)|diam(G)
4
C0 1
t
, (17)
which is a useful bound for sparse graphs of small diameter.
As we have demonstrated above, our general approach to
choosing coordinate subspaces combines very naturally with
the literature in algebraic and spectral graph theory, yielding
a reasonably rich understanding of the convergence rates for
various choices of network structure. In particular, this ap-
proach can be used to analyze algorithms for specific net-
works without needing to start from scratch. It would be
of interest to compute similar bounds for general classes
of hypergraphs, to better understand the trade-offs between
the convergence rate and the size/connectivity of coordinate
subspaces.
3Note that of course these are just upper bounds on the true
convergence rates.
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Figure 3: Log of fraction of captured network surplus vs.
number of trading interactions for fair edge dynamic (green
lines; top) and fair node dynamic (blue lines; below).
